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II. PUBLIC LAW
Jefferson B. Fordham*
A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Officers and Employees
It is certainly the conventional view that the fixing of sal-
aries of public officers is a legislative function.' In the case of
the elective office of marshal of a city court, established under
Section 29 of the Lawrason Act,2 the legislature has expressly
delegated the power to parish and municipal governing author-
ities. The statute requires that the marshal's salary be paid by
the police jury and the governing body of the municipality and
that each shall fix its share "in such amount as shall be deter-
mined by it." Ward Five of Allen Parish includes the City of
Oakdale. The city's share of the salary of the marshal of the city
court was fixed at ten dollars per month, effective December 1,
1942. The parish police jury matched that figure. The marshal
sought mandamus to compel the governing body of the city "to
provide and pay him a salary of $1250 per year, payable month-
ly."'3 His position was that there had been an effort to remove him
from office by the indirect and unauthorized means of fixing an
absurdly low salary. To lay the ground for mandamus, he con-
tended that the salary-fixing function was ministerial. 4 The trial
court took evidence on what was a proper salary, determined that
there had been an abuse of discretion and granted mandamus
ordering the payment of $100 per month from December 1, 1942,
as the city's share. The supreme court, in affirming on appeal,
reviewed the evidence concerning salary and refused to declare
the amount fixed by the district court excessive.
This is a rather astounding example of judicial divagation
from the proper sphere of the courts. The Constitution carefully
ordains that no function shall ever be attached to a court of rec-
ord "except such as are judicial. '5 No fault is found with the de-
termination that the governing body of the city had abused its
discretion. It is within the judicial province, moreover, to require
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See I Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5 ed. 1911) §§ 421-422.
2. La. Act 136 of 1898, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §5436].
3. State ex rel. Bass v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of City of Oak-
dale, 207 La. 415, 21 So. (2d) 482 (1945).
4. The case first went to the supreme court on appeal from a judgment
of dismissal sustaining an exception of no right or cause of action. 204 La.
940, 16 So. (2d) 527 (1944). The judgment was annulled and the case re-
manded for trial on the merits. The report discloses relator's theory that
the duty to fix his salary was ministerial.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 3.
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a city council to exercise a discretion where the law imposes a
duty to act." But that is a far cry from this case in which the
court effectually ousted the local legislative body from its statu-
tory jurisdiction and exercised the discretion itself. The need
for judicial restraint was particularly strong because the govern-
ing bodies of both the city and parish were involved and each
had discretion as to its share but only one was involved in the
case.
7
The relatrix, in State ex tel. Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School
Board," sought mandamus to compel the school board to reinstate
her as principal of a grammar school. She had acquired stand-
ing as a permanent teacher under the Teacher's Tenure Law.
That act provides that no permanent teacher may be removed
from office except on written and signed charges of (1) wilful
neglect of duty, (2) incompetency, or (3) dishonesty, and then
only after found guilty following a hearing by the parish school
board. A copy of the charges must be served upon the teacher
at least fifteen days prior to the hearing. In the summer of 1941
the school board, on complaint of parents of pupils and without
written charges or proper notice to relatrix, had a hearing in her
absence and demoted her to the rank of teacher in another school
at thirty dollars less per month. Shortly thereafter she brought
this suit. That prodded the parish superintendent of schools into
filing written charges, but on motion of relatrix, the board dis-
missed them as too vague and insufficient to state a case. As
directed by the board, further inquiry was made and specific
written charges filed. Relatrix was duly served with notice and
appeared at the hearing. There was evidence that relatrix had
not done an accurate and reliable job of filing regular official
reports about enrollment, attendance and related matters and
that she could not get along with parents and the other teachers.
Her salary was predicated in part upon average daily attendance.
The board found the charges sustained and demoted her in ac-
6. 4 Dillon, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1489.
7. Since neither the parish nor the police jury was party to the case,
the court remarked that nothing was decided as to them. The effect, how-
ever, of telling the city how much to pay was to leave the parish little
choice since it is not perceived how the court could have fixed the city's share
entirely without reference to what was a proper total salary for the office.
It is doubted that it was within the province of the court to fix even a
minimum salary. That was done in State ex rel. Thurmond v. City of
Shreveport, 124 La. 178, 50 So. 3 (1909). As a practical matter, to fix the
minimum would be to fix the salary. The court's true function in such cases
is to veto abuse of discretion. It does not have the affirmative duty to articu-
late a definite rate or salary any more than in the utility rate regulation
cases.
8. 206 La. 317, 19 So. (2d) 153 (1944).
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cordance with its previous action. Meanwhile the mandamus
proceeding had remained in statu quo. Relatrix reactivated it
with a supplemental petition covering intervening events. In
the district court she had judgment on the merits. The supreme
court affirmed with one judge dissenting and one absent. On
rehearing at the instance of defendant the court reversed itself
and dismissed the suit. Three judges dissented. Then relatrix
sought a rehearing which, after further review of the record,
was denied.
The basis of decision in the Rathe case was that the occasion
was one for judicial restraint and non-interference in reviewing
an administrative determination since there was substantial evi-
dence before the board to support a finding of wilful neglect of
duty or incompetence. The dissenting judges insisted that this
approach was improper because the statute reserved the right
of appeal. While it may be doubted that the reservation was in-
tended to save anything more than appropriate judicial review
of administrative action, the decision does heighten the need for
well-developed, orderly administrative procedure. It is unfortu-
nate that the board did not follow correct procedure in the first
instance. A new start was made after the board had taken action
adverse to the relatrix. It is significant that, contrary to a ruling
of the attorney general, the court treated the demotion of rela-
trix as a removal from office within the meaning of the Teacher's
Tenure Law.
Burk v. Livingston Parish Police Jury0 was a suit for the
$2500 balance alleged to be due under a compromise agreement
for architectural services. The defendant, in reconvention, asked
for annulment of the contract and return of payments made.
The trial court rejected both demands. It appeared that Burk
was retained by the police jury in 1933 to draw plans for a court-
house and jail building to cost $225,000. He drew the plans but
the police jury was unable to finance the project. In 1936 he was
employed and prepared plans for a building of more modest cost.
But again financing failed. In January 1937 the police jury, by
resolution, retained him to prepare plans for a $165,000 building
and fixed his fee at seven per centum of the total cost. The police
jury failed to obtain a grant of federal funds so the $165,000
9. After the first rehearing relatrix moved to vacate and recall the opin-
ion because Judge Higgins' brother was superintendent of schools of the
parish and thus he should have been recused, which would have left the
judges in a three-to-three stalemate. The motion was denied as not season-
ably made and because the brother was not a party.
10. 207 La. 533, 21 So. (2d) 719 (1945).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
building project failed. During all this period Burk was paid
nothing. In 1940 he submitted a bill for nearly $18,000 but indi-
cated he would take $12,419.49 if provision for payment were
made. The police jury by resolution accepted his offer, which
apparently was to cover preparation of plans for a $100,000
building. The building was planned and constructed pursuant
to that compromise agreement and this suit was for the balance
due under it. The defendant contended that the January 1937
resolution controlled; that the 1940 agreement was void because
it called for a donation of public funds in violation of Article IV,
Sections 3 and 12 of the Constitution. The supreme court re-
jected this argument, although it does not appear in the opinion
what the asserted inconsistency was, on the ground that the
building was actually constructed under the 1940 agreement and
Burk was seeking payment merely of what he had earned under
it. The court gave judgment for Burk as prayed.
The report of the Burk case is hardly full enough to enable
commentary. The changes in plans all required more work by
him so it was not a case of providing extra pay on a fixed trans-
action. Since the architectural work was one of the items of cost
in constructing the building, it is worth noting that the fee should
have been provided for out of the capital fund created for the
project.
In 1931 Hartwig Moss Insurance Agency, Limited, was, by
written contract, appointed "agent" of the Board of Commis-
sioners of, the Port of New Orleans "to handle the writing and
renewing of all its insurance" for a period of five years. No di-
rect compensation was to be paid but the agent was to retain all
commissions and payments earned by it in placing insurance.
After some three and one-half years the board, in writing, de-
manded of the agency that its policies be canceled and that un-
earned premiums be refunded and served notice that the contract
was terminated. The agency sued for damages for breach of
contract.1 In its answer the board's main reliance was that it
was a state agency without authority to make a binding, exclu-
sive, insurance-agency contract for a period of five years. A
judgment below for the plaintiff was reversed and the case dis-
missed on appeal. It was recognized that the board had authority
to "employ" an insurance agency. But contracts for fixed terms
were something else. Public policy, said the court, forbids that
a state agency impair its freedom of removing its employees
by entering into contracts of employment for definite periods of
11. Hartwig Moss Ins. Agency, Ltd. v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New
Orleans, 206 La. 395, 19 So. (2d) 178 (1944).
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time. The instant contract was one of employment and, thus,
ultra vires. Plaintiff insisted that it was an independent con-
tractor. As to that the court had this to say:
"Conceding without holding that plaintiff was an inde-
pendent contractor, the fact remains that it was employed by
the Dock Board as its agent. The relationship of employer
and employee existed, even though it be said that the plaintiff
was an independent contractor.'11
Surely it is an extraordinary jural pattern in Louisiana for one
to be at once an independent contractor, agent and employee."
Perhaps it would have been enough to say that the contract was
not expressly authorized by law and authority for it was not to be
rested upon implication. A business agent is hardly the same as
a public officer or employee. The court is committed to the view,
as to officers and employees, whose terms are not fixed by law,
that the power of removal is incident to the power to appoint. 4
The board did not deny its amenability to suit in contract.
In 1942 it had been decided that the board was a state agency
not subject to suit in tort, since legal authority had not been
granted for such suit. 15 That reasoning appears to be equally
applicable to contractual actions.
Law-Making by Local Units-Defect of Vagueness
Act 273 of 19261 authorizes the police jury of a parish, sub-
ject to the approval of the conservation commissioner, to "cur-
tail" the open season for squirrels and other game animals, when
necessary for restocking. The statute provided that annual spe-
cial parish closed seasons should commence on the legal date of
the open seasons in each year and limited parish curtailment to
a maximum of three years. The police jury of Concordia Parish
adopted an ordinance, in April 1943, which ordained that the open
season for "wild deer, bear and squirrels" within the parish was
thereby "curtailed" for the open seasons 1943-44, 1944-45 and
1945-46. Beyond that there was only a recital that a curtailment
was necessary for restocking and that the conservation commis-
sioner's consent had been given. One Edwards was convicted
12. 206 La. 395, 413, 19 So. (2d) 178, 184.
13. See the code definition of mandate. Art. 2986, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. Potts v. Morehouse Parish School Board, 177 La. 1103, 150 So. 290
(1933).
15. Miller v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 199 La. 1071, 7 So.
(2d) 355 (1942).
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2939.
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of killing squirrels in violation of this ordinance. 7 The hunting
in question took place on October first, which was the first day
of the state's open season. The defendant had challenged the
ordinance as invalid for vagueness both by motion to quash and
motion for a new trial. The supreme court annulled the convic-
tion and ordered dismissal of the suit. It found the ordinance
meaningless and thus invalid. This effective theory of abortive
enactment obviates occasion to resort to the constitutional re-
quirement of due process of law. The moral, of course, is that
penal measures, in particular, should be carefully drafted with
a view to reasonable predictability as to conduct under the ban.
Overlapping Units-Parish Taxation in a Municipality
The Town of Abbeville brought suit to annul the four-mill
parish alimony tax for 1942 as applied within the town.'" The
special charter of the town excluded the town from parish juris-
diction save for certain taxes not here pertinent. The police
jury's answer relied on Act 88 of the Extraordinary Session of
1921,19 which authorized the parish alimony tax without limita-
tion, and Section 11 of Article XIV of the Constitution, which sets
a four-mill maximum on parish taxes but declares the limit in-
applicable to any other levy elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion. The theory as to this constitutional provision was that it
rendered the confirmation, by Section 7 of Article XIV, of special
charter withdrawals of property in municipalities from parish
taxing jurisdiction inapplicable to the parish alimony tax. But
the court, in affirming a judgment for the town, pointed out that
the two sections had no connection because Section 7 provided
no tax levy-it merely confirmed withdrawals from parish taxing
jurisdiction. One might add that the saving provision of the
Section 11 was simply designed to make it clear that the tax
limit did not apply to the numerous special levies for public
improvements, debt service, and what not, elsewhere authorized
by the Constitution. But it was more difficult to square the 1921
act with the special charter. To support its conclusion that there
was no implied repeal the court stressed the authorization in the
1921 act to levy taxes upon "taxable property." This term, how-
ever, appears to be used in contradistinction to classes of prop-
erty which are immune or exempt from taxation.
17. State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 21 So. (2d) 624 (1945).
18. Town of Abbeville v. Police Jury of Vermilion Parish, 207 La. 779,
22 So. (2d) 62 (1945).
19. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6434-6435.
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The further objection in the Abbeville case, that the uni-
formity and equality clause of the State Constitution was vio-
lated, is met by Section 7 of Article XIV, which, in effect, modi-
fies that clause by confirming municipal withdrawal from parish
taxing jurisdiction.
Parish Boundaries
The case of Parish of Lafourche v. Parish of Jefferson2 0 calls
for but brief commentary in this review of recent cases. La-
fourche had proceeded under Section 2624 of the Revised Stat-
utes21 to ascertain and fix its common boundary with Jefferson.
That section directed that, at the time specified by ordinance,
the surveyors of the two parishes concerned proceed with run-
ning and marking the boundary. In this case the surveyors could
not agree so each ran a separate survey. Lafourche brought this
suit to have the boundary fixed in accordance with its survey.
The result of a thorough review on the merits by the supreme
court was to sustain the Lafourche survey, with modifications, for
so much of the line as the court found to be determinable by ref-
erence to the pertinent statutes or the evidence in the record.
As for the rest, the case was remanded for the taking of further
evidence in view of the possible availability of such evidence
suggested by broken lines drawn on official federal and state
maps. The making of separate surveys was taken to be substan-
tial compliance with the statute since the parties could not reach
an accord or joint action. Perhaps the legislature could improve
upon the basic method by requiring an independent inquiry and
survey by special commissioner subject to judicial confirmation.2 2
Finance
Suit was brought by the seller against a parish school board
for the $353.96 balance due on a purchase of athletic equipment
by a high school principal and the athletic director of the school.2 3
Plaintiff alleged its reliance upon the ostensible authority of
those officials and alleged that the board had insured the equip-
ment, collected ninety per centum of the amount of the policy
when the gear burned and bought replacement equipment with
20. 206 La. 615, 19 So. (2d) 328 (1944).
21. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6356.
22. Compare the method of the United States Supreme Court in settling
state boundaries. See, for example, Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213, 64 S.
Ct. 975; 322 U.S. 654, 64 S. Ct. 1202 (1944).
23. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co. v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board, 207 La. 52, 20 So. (2d) 422 (1944).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the insurance proceeds. It specially pleaded estoppel. The board
denied that the principal and athletic director had been in any
wise authorized to act. There had been paid to plaintiff $157.39,
against a total purchase price of $511.35. On certiorari to the
court of appeal the supreme court set aside a judgment for the
board and granted judgment for the plaintiff in the amount
prayed. The rationale took the form of ratification, not estoppel.
No authorities were cited..14 Stress was laid upon the board's
assertion of ownership of the equipment. That boils down to
making out ratification from acceptance and enjoyment of bene-
fits, presumably with knowledge of the antecedent facts. Act
127 of 194025 requires that purchases of supplies exceeding five
hundred dollars, to be paid for from public funds, shall be adver-
tised and let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder. Rati-
fication is hardly an answer when such a requirement is not fol-
lowed in the first instance because there can be no compliance
nunc pro tunc. This point was not presented in the case.
The National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans sued the
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricul-
tural College for $300,000 evidenced by a note executed in the
name of the board by Smith, the president of the university. 8
Smith had effected the loan on the strength of a purported reso-
lution of the board, a copy of which, certified by him as board
secretary, was submitted to the bank. The resolution was spu-
rious; this the bank admitted at the trial. The bank credited the
university with the full amount of the loan and Smith immedi-
ately obtained a cashier's check from the bank payable to a well-
known brokerage firm for $300,000. The bank charged the amount
to the board's account. The university never received any benefit
from the loan. The board filed an exception of no right and no
cause of action based on the failure of the petition to show that
the loan had been approved by the State Bond and Tax Board.
The district court referred the exception to the merits. The
board answered relying on the lack of State Bond and Tax Board
approval, the unauthorized character of the loan and the alleged
neglect of the bank in making it and paying out the proceeds
without inquiry and other grounds. After trial on the exception
and the merits the court sustained the exception and dismissed
24. See Art. 3021, La. Civil Code of 1870, which requires express ratifica-
tion in the ordinary principal-mandatory situation.
25. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6730.
26. National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans v. Board of Sup'rs of
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 206 La.
913, 20 So. (2d) 264 (194).
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the suit.27 The supreme court affirmed. Since the only point
raised by the exception related to State Bond and Tax Board
approval, none of the other grounds of defense were before the
supreme court.
Act 6 of the Second Extra Session of 1935 2 8 created the State
Bond and Tax Board for the recited purpose of protecting the
faith and credit of the state, its parishes, municipalities, public
boards and political or public corporations by preventing the in-
curring of excessive debts and the levying of overburdensome
taxes. It required the board's prior approval before the incur-
ring of any debt by any governmental unit of the categories listed
and provided that any debt incurred or obligation issued without
such approval should be null and void. The court held the stat-
ute applicable to the defendant body as a public board, a political
or public corporation as those terms were used in the statute.
The view that the act applied only to governmental units which
exercise the taxing power, the court reasoned, reads out of the
law the reference to public boards, political or public corpora-
tions. Certainly it would narrow the application of those terms.
The bank was permitted at the trial to attack the constitutionality
of the act though this had not been pleaded. The supreme court
approved because the bank could not have been expected to antic-
ipate defense reliance on the statute and our practice does not al-
low any further pleading, after answer, such as a replication. The
constitutional objection was delegation of legislative power. It
was rejected on the theory that the subject was not one which
permitted of precise standards and that the broad standards of
excessiveness of taxes and over-burdensomeness of debt were
constitutionally sufficient guides for the Bond and Tax Board.
Actually, while they meet the constitutional test, these are very
loose criteria in a poorly drawn statute.
2 9
The bank also relied on Act 223 of 1936,30 which broadly au-
thorized borrowing by the university board and made no mention
of State Bond and Tax Board approval. The court frowned upon
27. Is it not a burdensome and expensive practice to reserve an excep-
tion, which goes to the legal sufficiency of the cause alleged and which in-
volves legal questions only, require the defendant to answer and try the
case on the merits, only to uphold the exception in the end and dismiss
the suit?
28. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8911.1-8911.12.
29. La. Act 285 of 1944 (Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 8911.2-8911.12] is a
complete new State Bond and Tax Board statute, which does not even men-
tion the earlier act. It contains a general repealer. It is a limited improve-
ment on the original act, which was a purely political measure. That act
went so far as to deny public access to the records of the board.
30. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2575.29-2575.42.
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implied repeal and could think of no reason why the legislature
should have intended that the earlier act not apply to university
borrowing. The old formula about implied repeals being in dis-
favor is overworked. The civil code formulation, based on ir-
reconcilable conflict, is more helpful 11
Regulations in the Interest of Public Morals-Local Option
A hotel guest invited friends to his room for a game. They
were apprehended playing cards for money and were prosecuted
under a city ordinance which clearly covered the case. The city
council had charter authority to "preserve the peace and good
order of the city" and, among other things, to close all gambling
houses and to expel from the city or to imprison all bunco men,
lottery men, common cheats and swindlers, beggars and dan-
gerous and suspicious characters." The defendants' motion to
quash on the ground that the ordinance was ultra vires was over-
ruled and they were convicted in city court. The supreme court
set aside the conviction and sustained the motion to quash.32 The
situation was substantially on all fours with an earlier case which
had arisen in Baton Rouge. 3 In both, the authority granted by
the legislature related to closing gambling places and punishing
or expelling professional gamblers and did not extend to gam-
bling at cards as such. The general power to preserve the peace
and good order hardly seems to cover the case in view of the spe-
cific treatment of gambling by the charter.
The Local Option Law of Louisiana is a prolific breeder of
litigation. It will be remembered that the law permits resort to
local option at the ward, municipal or parish level. How anyone
could expect any such device to provide effective prohibition is
a just query but collateral to this discussion.
In State v. Jordan3" the defendant was prosecuted for manu-
facturing intoxicating liquor, containing over one-half of one
per centum of alcohol by volume, in violation of a parish ordi-
nance. It was proved that he had made four bottles of beer,
which were found at his home; there was nothing further to show
that he was in the manufacturing business. The law authorizes
local option as to the "business" of producing, manufacturing,
and so on, of intoxicating liquor and it appeared from the pre-
amble of the ordinance that the proposition submitted at the
31. Art. 23, La. Civil Code of 1870.
32. City of Bogalusa v. Sallis, 207 La. 185, 20 So. (2d) 808 (1945).
33. City of Baton Rouge v. Weis, 141 La. 99, 74 So. 709 (1917).
34. 207 La. 78, 20 So. (2d) 543 (1944).
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local option election related to the "business" of manufacturing
and so on. Section one of the ordinance flatly forbade manufac-
ture. The supreme court in setting aside the conviction of de-
fendant, sustained the contention that Section one of the ordi-
nance was ultra vires and invalid.. It went beyond both the law
and the proposition approved by the voters. In 1939, however,
the court had sustained a similar provision with respect to sale
of liquor. 35 The law was interpreted to mean "act" or "traffic"
where it said "business." The court went further in that case;
it concluded that, even though the statute covered only cases of
engaging in business, the ordinance would be a valid regulation
in aid of the prohibition upon the business of selling liquor.
When it came to distinguishing that case, it was said in the
Jordan opinion that it had been decided in the earlier case that
selling liquor is per se engaging in the selling business. Making
four bottles of beer, on the other hand, was not to be regarded
as engaging in the manufacturing business. This distinction will
not stand up. An isolated sale is no more engaging in business
than an isolated manufacture. What we have here is an impor-
tant narrowing in the interpretation of the statute.
Liquor dealers, who were also residents and taxpayers in
Ward 2 of Livingston Parish, sued to nullify a local option elec-
tion held in the ward, and the ordinance passed pursuant there-
to. 6 They alleged that the election petition did not carry the
signatures of the requisite twenty-five per centum of the quali-
fied voters of the ward, since many names were duplicated, many
names were those of deceased persons and some were signed
by persons other than those bearing them; that the election
commissioners were chosen beforehand by conspiracy between
the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Elections, the Sec-
retary of the Police Jury and the leader of the drys in accord-
ance with which the chairman appointed them vithout board
action; and that the election was illegally conducted in specified
respects. The district court dismissed the suit on defendant's
exception of no cause and no right of action. This judgment was
annulled on appeal and the case remanded for answer and trial.
The rule that one contesting an election for irregularities must
show that they affected the result was deemed inapplicable be-
cause the cause of action here was based upon lack of authority
in calling and illegality in holding the election. Jurisdiction to
35. State v. Bonner, 193 La. 387, 190 So. 621 (1939).
36. Felder v. Police Jury of Livingston Parish, 207 La. 550, 21 So. (2d)
724 (1945).
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call the election depended upon there being a sufficient petition.
If the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Elections, more-
over, did, acting alone as alleged, appoint the election commis-
sioners, there were no legally appointed commissioners to con-
duct the election because the authority to appoint lay with the
board acting as such.
Perot v. Police Jury of Natchitoches Parish"' presented a
number of questions affecting local option elections. Residents
of the parish sued to have an ordinance adopted pursuant to local
option election annulled and to have its enforcement enjoined.
Defendant had judgment on the merits dismissing the suit.
(1) Plaintiffs contended that the police jury improperly refused
to consider a counterpetition on which there were some five hun-
dred signatures of persons who had signed the election petition
and whose withdrawal would bring the total below the required
twenty-five per centum of qualified voters in the parish. There
were about one thousand names on the counterpetition and no
showing by certificate of the registrar of voters or otherwise that
there were five hundred voters whose names appeared on both
petitions. The sighers of the counterpetition requested with-
drawal from the original petition if their names appeared on it.
On these facts the court held that the police jury was not bound
to carry the onerous burden of checking the counterpetition for
withdrawals and of determining whether the signers were quali-
fied voters. The latter point had already been determined as to
the original petition, however, so the only burden was to deter-
mine duplication of signatures. (2) The contention that the
local option law was unconstitutional for want of express con-
stitutional authorization was, of course, rejected, because, in the
absence of express limitation, state legislative power is plenary.
(3) That there had been a ward local option election six months
before was nbt controlling under the provision limiting such
elections to one a year since that affected the ward only, not the
parish. (4) People who resided in a ward which had previously
voted dry properly signed as petitioners since this was a par-
ish-wide election involving the parish as a unit. (5) Under its
charter the City of Natchitoches had authority to regulate liquor
traffic and the police jury was broadly denied jurisdiction in the
city. This was held not to preclude parish-wide local option on
the theory that the voters were acting and the police jury was
simply proceeding under their mandate. Actually, do we not
37. 208 La. 1, 22 So. (2d) 666 (1945).
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have here an implied amendment by a later law of an earlier
special one? (6) Since the scheme is parish-wide, local option
voters living in the city were qualified to sign the petition. (7)
The petition tracked the statutory definition of mild liquor and
hard liquor but combined them in one question or proposition.
It covered the business of producing, manufacturing, rectifying,
blending or handling, selling, using, distributing, storing or con-
suming. The single proposition submitted by the police jury to
the voters covered only sale and keeping for sale. The court, in
keeping with a 1943 decision cited in the opinion, held that sepa-
rate propositions as to mild and hard liquor were not required.
Nothing appears to have been made of the fact that the proposi-
tion voted on was narrowed to selling and keeping for sale
whereas the petition related to manufacturing and other activity
as recited above.
Dedication of Land to Public Use
By Act 99 of 1924 the Orleans Levee District was authorized
to construct a spillway in an area north of New Orleans to pro-
tect the city from flood. The board was authorized to acquire
the necessary land by donation, purchase or expropriation. There
was a tract of some thirty-five acres of relatively high land
fronting the river, which lay within the boundaries of the Bo-
hemia Spillway, which the levee district constructed under the
1924 act. The tract was never actually used as a part of the
spillway. In 1922 it had been adjudicated to the state for unpaid
taxes. In 1938 plaintiffs proceeded under Act 47 of 193838 to re-
deem the land and obtained a certificate of redemption from the
Register of the State Land Office. They brought a petitory ac-
tion against the Orleans Levee Board. 9 The court of appeal re-
versed a judgment for plaintiffs and entered judgment for de-
fendant dismissing the suit. The supreme court affirmed on the
theory that, although the 1924 act did not contain express words
of dedication it did make provision for acquisition of all land in
the spillway area and disclosed an intent to remove all that land
from commerce, which is enough to make out statutory dedica-
tion. The court regarded the dedication as in fee, not of a servi-
tude, since the act required the acquisition of title in fee to land
in the spillway area. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented on the
ground that there was no state dedication or transfer to the levee
board. While the majority opinion dwelt at some length on com-
38. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8466.8-8466.11.
39. Emery v. Orleans Levee Board, 207 La. 386, 21 So. (2d) 418 (1945).
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mon law dedication, its application where the state is the asserted
dedicator is not apparent. Surely were a dedication by statute
intended there would be no difficulty in saying so and that with
adequate reference to the subject land and to the effect of the
grant.
Vacation of Streets
Act 382 of 193840 authorizes police juries and municipalities
"in their discretion" to revoke and set aside the dedication of all
roads, streets and alleyways laid out and dedicated to public use
within their limits, when such ways have been "abandoned or
are no longer needed for public purposes." The Police Jury of
the Parish of East Baton Rouge, after conducting a hearing and
receiving the report of committee appointed to investigate the
subject, adopted an ordinance vacating a street in a subdivision
near Baton Rouge. The street was unnamed and apparently
unused. The persons who sponsored the vacation owned all
abutting land except one lot. Some years before, at the instance
of the realty company, which had developed the area, a portion
of the street, to the north was vacated leaving a large tract to
the north, which was sold with a view to the construction of a
convent. Meantime, however, the realty company repurchased
the tract and included it in a new subdivision it was developing.
That company promptly sought an injunction against the promul-
gation of the ordinance and the closing of the street." On the
trial of a rule to show cause why a temporary injunction should
not issue the trial court found that, on a preponderance of the
evidence, the police jury erred in its determination that the
street was no longer useful for public purposes and granted the
injunction. Much of the supreme court's opinion is concerned
with emphasizing that the basic decision lay with the police jury
and the courts should not interpose except in case of abuse of
power in the form of capricious or arbitrary action. Yet that
court affirmed because it could find no abuse of his discretion by
the trial judge. Is this consistent? The trial judge did not give
the police jury the benefit of the doubt; he acted on a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence without suggestion of police jury
40. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5856-5857.1.
41. Caz-Perk Realty, Inc. v. Police Jury of Parish of East Baton Rouge,
207 La. 796, 22 So. (2d) 121 (1945).
The terminology of the statute is rather unconventional. A local gov-
erning body is authorized to revoke and set aside dedications. It is not clearjust how a city council could revoke a dedication made by a private dedi-
cator.
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abuse of power. The case is indicative of what may be described
as a tendency toward government by judiciary in Louisiana.
Amenability of Local Units to Prescription Acquirendi Causa
In 1944, the supreme court rendered what was regarded as
its first decision that a local unit of government, specifically a
levee district, was subject to prescription acquirendi causa.42 The
case involved land which plaintiffs and their authors in title had
held adversely for long over ten years. In their slander of title
action they relied on prescription acquirendi causa and estoppel
based on the district's levying and collecting of taxes on the
property from them and their authors in title for nearly fifty
years. Defendants converted the case into a petitory action by
claiming title from the state under a transfer made in 1896. The
state's title, it was alleged, derived from a tax sale of 1893. The
defendants appealed from a judgment for plaintiffs. The sole
question presented on appeal was whether the district was im-
mune from prescription. In 1927 the court had delivered a dictum
that prescription liberandi causa ran against the Board of Com-
missioners of Port of New Orleans.43 The following year such
prescription was given effect by the court against a levee district
board.4" And, in 1929, prescription based on possession of land for
ten years was held to have run against a levee board.4 5 This
was not called acquisitive prescription in the opinion, but such
it must have been. In the instant case it was termed liberative
prescription, which meant that the earlier case was not consid-
ered strictly in point. The court squarely faced an asserted dis-
tinction between the two types of prescription, as applied to a
levee board, and found no substance in it. Whether this conclu-
sion will enjoy catholicity as to all types of local agencies of gov-
ernment and without regard to differences in public uses remains
to be seen. Certainly it is not to be assumed to cover public ways
and places, such as streets.46
42. Haas v. Board of Com'rs of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou Boeuf
Levee District, 206 La. 378, 19 So. (2d) 173 (1944).
43. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans v. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 163
La. 865, 113 So. 127 (1927).
44. Board of Com'rs of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801,
120 So. 373 (1928).
45. Board of Com'rs of Tensas Basin Levee District v. Earle, 169 La. 565,
125 So. 619 (1930).
46. See generally Elliott, Roads and Streets (4 ed. 1926) § 1188. He cites
Mayor v. Magnon, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 2 (La. 1815), as supporting the view that
highways cannot be lost by adverse possession. That case Involved a sec-
tion of the river bank In New Orleans which was public domain. The court
stressed the assumption that the land in suit was inalienable public land
out of oommerce.
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Municipal Elections
Prejean filed with the Democratic Executive Committee for
the Parish of East Baton Rouge his application to be qualified
as a candidate for City Judge of Baton Rouge in the September
12, 1944, primary. A qualified elector, proceeding under Section
28 of Act 46 of 1940,1 objected to Prejean's candidacy on the
ground that he did not meet the residence requirements to qualify
as an elector in the city. The objector served a copy of his pro-
test by handing it to a lady at his alleged residence in Baton
Rouge on August 11, 1944. The statute required that service be
personal or domiciliary. The next day the committee gave him
the forty-eight hours allowed by law to answer. August 15 the
committee heard the protest and disqualified him. Meanwhile
Prejean had been in Mexico and did not return to Baton Rouge
until the sixteenth. Since the committee would not hear him he
promptly filed suit to compel it to certify his name to the secre-
tary of state as a candidate. 8 The committee filed several pre-
liminary exceptions, the gist of one of which was that Prejean,
by failing to answer the protest within forty-eight hours had
forfeited his standing to seek judicial review. The supreme court,
in affirming a judgment for plaintiff, found no merit in this ex-
ception because Prejean's absence precluded his exercise of his
right to answer. It is true that a contrary conclusion would have
had a harsh effect but there appears to have been domiciliary
service upon him in compliance with the statute and one who
is about to absent himself from the country can make forehanded
provision for the protection of his interests while he is away.
Under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to be an
elector for purposes of a municipal election a citizen must have
resided in the municipality for four months next preceding the
election. On the trial it appeared that Prejean owned two
homes, one in a suburb and one in the city. He and his family
moved into the latter in March, 1944, and thus had been there
over four months at the date of the election. The fact that he
had applied to have his place of registration as a voter changed
less than four months before the election was not considered
controlling. The period of residence required by the Constitution
must be reckoned back from the date of the particular election,
and were the governing statute to be deemed to require that the
47. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 2682.32.
48. Prejean v. East Baton Rouge Parish Democratic Executive Commit-
tee, 206 La. 658, 19 So. (2d) 376 (1944). The statute expressly authorized
judicial review in a suit against the committee as such.
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period run before one might register, it would be unconstitu-
tional. The statute reads that way; it exacts prior running of the
residence period.49
The trial court had ordered certification of Prejean's candi-
dacy to the secretary of state. Since the statute required that
ballots for a municipal election be furnished by the municipality,
certification should have been to the mayor. Apparently no one
noticed this error before the judgment was appealed from.
Counsel argued on the appeal that the error nullified the judg-
ment. The court rested its rejection of this contention on the
physical arrangement of the judgment. The first paragraph an-
nulled the committee's action disqualifying Prejean. The second
required the certification. The court reasoned that only the
first was necessary; once the committee action was annulled, its
duty to certify Prejean's candidacy to the proper authority was
clear, and it might be fairly assumed that it would cheerfully
discharge that duty. The court, however, did not stop with
knocking out the second paragraph of the judgment as surplus-
age; it so modified the judgment as to require certification to the
proper officer and, thus, amended for the benefit of the plaintiff-
appellee, who had not complained of the defect. Incidentally,
had the court merely annulled the second paragraph of the judg-
ment what was left would have been little more than a declara-
tory judgment.
B. TAXATION
Property Taxes
The sad state of the ad valorem property tax in Louisiana
has been discussed and lamented at some length in an earlier
issue of this REVIEW. 50 In the dense legal jungle of the general
property tax there is no area more strongly calculated to induce
profound concern in the mind of the student of public law than
that of tax titles. The pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions give the tax debtor the most indulgent consideration.
There is no personal liability for property taxes.51 The period of
redemption from tax sale was increased from one to three years
during the depression. 52  Unless, moreover, the purchaser insti-
49. La. Act 45 of 1940, Art. II, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 2615.10].
50. Fordham and Lob, Some Plain Talk About the Louisiana General
Property Tax (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REviuw 469.
51. The only recourse in the case of real property is sale of the specific
property on which the delinquent taxes were laid. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X,
§ 11.
52. This was done by amendment to La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11.
The initiatory act was La. Act 147 of 1932.
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tutes a special proceeding after the three years have run, inviting
attack by the debtor on the tax title, the debtor may launch such
an attack at any time within five years from the date of recorda-
tion of the tax deed.5 3 But this is far from all. The Constitution
provides that property sold at tax sale shall be redeemable at any
time during three years from the recordation of the tax sale.
The supreme court has held that this provision does not apply
to property adjudicated to the state at tax sale."4 This leaves the
way open for the state to permit redemption of adjudicated lands
many years after tax sale. Nor is this the full story. The inse-
curity of tax titles is greatly heightened by the success with
which attacks on them meet in the courts. The judges appear
to share the widespread disposition to favor the delinquent tax
debtor to the limit, which, of course, serves to invite further
attacks.
The cumulative effect of these things is to leave the collec-
tion of property taxes without an adequate sanction. Funda-
mentally, the evil goes deeper. The support of government is a
solemn obligation of citizenship. The emphasis should be upon
this primary consideration. It is for the taxpayer to be diligent
and conscientious, not to be inexcusably delinquent and then suc-
cessfully attack a tax sale many years after it was made. The
law tells the community when taxes are due. It is not to impose
an oppressive burden upon the citizen to expect of him that he
be businesslike in paying taxes as he is in meeting other current
charges such as insurance.
In Messina v. Owens55 the supreme court felt compelled to
lend its aid to a tax debtor who had been flagrantly working a
fraud upon the revenues. He sued to annul a tax sale and deed.
His petition alleged that the property in question had been ex-
empt from taxes as a homestead in 1935, 1936 and 1938 but not
in 1937 and that he resided and had resided for many years at
another address. In other words, he had obtained homestead
exemption in 1935 and 1936 by filing false certifications. He al-
leged that in July, 1938, the property was sold to defendant at
tax sale for 1937 taxes, that he received no prior notice of the
sale and that no advertisement of delinquency was made on fail-
ure to effect personal service. It appeared at the trial that a
notice had been addressed to him at the property in question, and
53. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 11.
54. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson Davis v. Grace, 182 La. 64, 161 So.
22 (1935). But see Westwego Canal and Terminal Co. v. Lafourche Basin
Levee District, 206 La. 270, 19 So. (2d) 133 (1944).
55. 207 La. 967, 22 So. (2d) 286 (1945).
[Vol. VI
1946] WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 559
sent registered mail. It was returned marked "Del Atpt" (de-
livery attempted). The tax collector made no further effort to
effect service and did not make newspaper publication as re-
quired by law in cases of unknown owners. In 1937 he had ap-
plied for and effected homestead exemption on the property
where he actually resided. This suit was not brought until nearly
five years after the sale. The court of appeal reversed a judg-
ment for the plaintiff.56 That court was shocked by the soiled
state of the hands which reached out for judicial aid. The su-
preme court reversed that decision and ordered the judgment of
the district court reinstated. The court did not approve of plain-
tiff's conduct but concluded that there was a fatal flaw in the
sale upon which he was legally entitled to rely. When the regis-
tered letter was returned the tax collector should, in the court's
view, have made inquiry as to plaintiff's whereabouts and, if
unsuccessful in finding him, should have published notice as in
cases of unknown owners.
Every lawyer knows that adjudication is not strictly a proc-
ess of finding the applicable law and then applying it to the
matter at hand. What commonly takes place is, first, a determi-
nation on the general merits, which may be affected by a complex
of ideas and influences, some of which will likely be inarticulate,
and, second, the finding of a legal rationalization patterned to the
case. In the Messina case, as a formulation supporting denial of
relief, the court might have declared that the plaintiff would be
estopped, after certifying to the tax authorities that X was his
residence for purposes of working a fraud on the revenues, from
repudiating his falsification in attacking the tax collector's notice
served in reliance thereon.
Land of J Company was adjudicated to the state at tax sale
in 1926. In 1937 the Register of the State Land Office instructed
the sheriff of the parish of situs to advertise the property for sale
under Act 161 of 1934, which was a special redemption measure
produced by the depression. The regular procedure for selling
land which has been adjudicated to the state is set out in Act 237
of 1924.57 L Company, the purchaser at the tax sale, sued the J
Company in slander of title. It was proved at the trial that the
three-year redemption clause, used in ordinary tax sales, had
been lined out of the tax deed with ink and the words "under
Act 161 of 1934" inserted, both after recordation and at the in-
56. Messina v. Owens, 21 So. (2d) 426 (La. App. 1944).
57. As amended by La. Act 296 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) §§ 8480,
8483-8486.
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stance of the sheriff. J Company's offer to redeem, made within
three years of sale was rejected. It thereupon deposited the
money with the tax collecter and obtained and recorded a receipt.
The supreme court affirmed a judgment recognizing the J Com-
pany as owner of the land. The assumption, without citation of
authority, was that the provisions of Act 170 of 1898, which gov-
ern ordinary tax sales and which, as modified by Section 11 of
Article X of the Constitution as amended in 1932,58 permits re-
demption at any time within three years after sale, applied in
this case. The general statute governing sales of adjudicated
lands is Act 237 of 1924.19 It makes no provision for redemption.
The J Company had its chance under Act 170 of 1898 back in the
twenties. The instant sale was ordered under Act 161 of 1934,
which makes no provision for redemption." The case, then, was
one in which a delinquent tax debtor was given a second redemp-
tion period by judicial fiat many years after the original tax sale!
In 1937 certain real property was sold to Pitre at tax sale.
In 1938 the tax debtor obtained a judgment annulling the sale
for a defect not pertinent to this discussion. In October, 1939,
while that case was on appeal, the property was sold for taxes
assessed to Pitre. A levee district appropriated part of it in
1940 in the course of constructing a levee. In 1941 the tax debtor
instituted suit for the value of the property taken and shortly
thereafter redeemed the property from the state."' One ground
of defense on the merits was that title was in the state at the time
of the appropriation and, consequently, there was no taking from
the plaintiff. The supreme court's ruling on this point is impor-
tant. The court thought the adjudication to the state was void
because the tax sale to Pitre had been adjudged a nullity. But,
assuming such were not the case, the ground of defense failed,
nevertheless, because the constitutional three-year period of re-
demption applied to an adjudication to the state as well as to a
sale to a private purchaser and, during that period, the plaintiff
lost none of its rights. The title of the state was merely inchoate.
This means that the state cannot transfer a clear title until after
the constitutional redemptive period has run. Police Jury of
Parish of Jefferson Davis v. Grace 2 was distinguished as holding
merely that under the statutes a tax debtor may redeem from
58. La. Act 147 of 1932.
59. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8480-8489.
60. See Brock v. Lamarca, 1 So. (2d) 436 (La. App. 1941).
61. Westwego Canal and Terminal Co. v. Lafourche Basin Levee District,
206 La. 270, 19 So. (2d) 133 (1944).
82. 182 La. 64, 161 So. 22 (1935).
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the state as long as the state retains title. The decision in that
case, however, is clearly based on the view that Section 11 of Arti-
cle X of the Constitution has no application to adjudications to
the state. Chief Justice O'Niell laid it down that there is no limi-
tation in the Constitution upon the authority of the legislature
to determine the disposition of adjudicated property.
In a suit to quiet a tax title based upon prescription of five
years the citations granted the defendants but ten days in which
to answer.6 3 Eight defendants who resided in other parishes and
more than fifty miles from the courthouse of trial excepted to
the citation on the ground that fifteen days were allowed by law.
The exceptions were overruled and the defendants applied to
the supreme court for writs of certiorari and prohibition. That
court annulled the judgment and sustained the exceptions. The
Code of Practice extends the period for answer from ten to fif-
teen days in cases of defendants situated like the excepting de-
fendants in this case. Section 11 of Article X of the Constitu-
tion provides that the manner of notice and form of proceeding
to quiet tax titles shall be provided by law. Act 106 of 193464
provides that in a suit like this on three years prescription the
petition and citations shall be served as in ordinary suits and
grants six months in which to institute suit to annul. In a sub-
sequent section relating to cases based on five years prescription
the statute provides that the procedure shall be as set out in
earlier sections except that the delay for answer shall be ten
days instead of six months. The effect of the decision in the
stated case is to despoil the ten-day provision of Act 106 of mean-
ing, for if the Code of Practice governs by general reference it
covers all answers both of the ten-day and fifteen-day categories. 5
It is believed fair to say that the tax title cases just reviewed
strongly confirm the writer's preliminary remarks. The batting
average of the delinquent tax debtor was a cool one thousand.
Inheritance Tax
Pedrick, individually and as executor of his father, sought
by rule in the matter of his father's succession and against the
collector of Inheritance Taxes for the Parish of Orleans to have
the unconsumed balance due under a $15,000 refund annuity con.
63. LeBlanc v. Trahan, 207 La. 171, 20 So. (2d) 745 (1945).
64. Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 8502-8504.
65. This violates an elementary canon of interpretation. "It is elemen-
tary that effect must be given to all the provisions of a statute if it is pos-
sible to do so." Rogers, J., in City of Gretna v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 206 La.
715, 728, 20 So. (2d) 1, 5 (1944).
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tract of Pedrick Senior, in which he, the son, was named bene-
ficiary, adjudged free of the inheritance tax and to have $163.36
or deposit in the registry of the court returned to him. 6 The
contract cost $15,000. The contract was made in 1940. The an-
nuitant died in December 1942. The district court fixed the tax
at $163.36 and dismissed the rule. The supreme court affirmed.
This eminently sound decision is rested on the economic fact that
the annuity contract was an investment, not insurance. The gift
to the son was made in contemplation of death.
Unfortunately, the legislature took a backward step so far
as the inheritance tax is concerned when it adopted Act 221 of
1944. That statute puts annuity insurance proceeds on a footing,
for all legal purposes, with the proceeds of life insurance. It is
believed that the trend should be the other way. At present only
life insurance payable to one's estate is subject to the tax.6 7
Life insurance is a much employed medium of creating an estate;
many people use it instead of building up individual investments.
Most of the money fed into life insurance company coffers, more-
over, is invested outside Louisiana. The point is that life insur-
ance payable to named beneficiaries should be subject to the tax
as is the case under the Federal Estate Tax."
Power Tax
Six steam engines and a boiler were employed in the opera-
tion of six oil wells. Each engine was set up at a separate well
but all were connected to the lone boiler, which was capable of
operating a maximum of two at a time. The wells were pumped
exclusively by electric power purchased from a power company.
The engines were used but once or twice a year and then only
"to pull" the pipe in a well when stuck or leaky, "to pull" well
pumps when in need of repair, "to pull" sucker rods when used
or broken or in case of other trouble. The state power tax of
fifty cents per horsepower applies to "prime movers." Equip-
ment used for "standby or emergency purposes" is expressly ex-
cepted. The state brought suit for collection of the tax on the
above-described steam engines and boiler.6 9 A judgment for de-
fendants was affirmed by the supreme court. "Standby" was
taken to comprehend equipment used in case of sudden or unex-
pected breakdown or unavoidable accidents as well as machinery
66. Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So. (2d) 859 (1945).
67. See State v. Succession of Brewer, 190 La. 810, 182 So. 820 (1938).
68. 44 Stat. 71 (1926), 26 U.S.C.A. § 811 (g) (1934).
69. State v. Getty, 207 La. 89, 20 So. (2d) 546 (1944).
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used in lieu of a main power unit when the latter is out of com-
mission. That covered the case at hand. The fact that the even-
tualities were of a character which could be anticipated and were
in fact provided for in the ordinary course of business did not
deny them emergency character, any more than precautions
taken against fire render it non-emergency.
Local License Taxes on Persons Engaged in the
Insurance Business
The state license tax statute which imposes a license tax
on those engaged in the insurance business in the state, whether
they be domiciled in the state or operate here through agents or
representatives, empowers municipalities to impose such a tax
on those engaged in the business of issuing any form of insur-
ance contract which might then or later be subject to the state
tax. The measure of both state and local levies is gross annual
premiums. The City of Gretna imposed such a tax based on in-
surance covering risks located within the city even though the
taxpayer had no office, agent, or representative there. It sued to
collect the tax from a life insurance company and a fire and
marine insurance company in that category. 0 They filed excep-
tions of no cause of action, which were sustained by the trial
court. Their theory was that they were not doing business in
Gretna. The supreme court overruled the exceptions and re-
manded the case for disposition on the merits.71 In an earlier
case, involving a municipal license tax imposed under the au-
thority of the general license tax law, it had been held that there
was no authority to apply the tax to insurance on risks located
outside the city where the taxpayer had an office or agent even
though no license were paid on that business at the situs of the
risks.7 2 Thus, if the court ruled against the tax under scrutiny
here local license taxes might be avoided altogether. The court
concluded that only by considering that a person or company is
doing business in a city when it covers a risk could the statute be
given full effect. Stress was laid also upon a provision of the
act requiring annual reports to the secretary of state showing by
local governmental units, which levy insurance license taxes,
the total gross annual premiums on risks located in each such
70. City of Gretna v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 206 La. 715, 20 So. (2d) 1 (1944).
71. For the further course of this litigation see 207 La. 1085, 22 So. (2d)
658 (1945).
72. City of Shreveport v. New York Life Ins. Co., 141 La. 360, 75 So. 80
(1917).
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unit. The object of the provision was to render effective the
taxing power devolved upon local units.
The City of New Orleans sued the Kansas City Life Insur-
ance Company for license taxes for 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940. 73
The tax ordinance was similar, for present purposes, to the
Gretna measure involved in the case we have just discussed. The
company in this case, too, had neither an office nor an agent in
the city. Here, however, the company denied ever having issued
a policy on any person residing in New Orleans at the time of
issuance; all of the New Orleans business was renewals on pol-
icies issued to persons who moved to New Orleans after procur-
ing the insurance. The company's own evidence, however, dis-
closed that at least one policy was issued to a New Orleans resi-
dent in each of the years 1937, 1938 and 1939 and a course of
business for years involving company acceptance of New Orleans
applications. From the latter fact the supreme court inferred
that the company continued through 1940 issuing insurance to
New Orleans applicants. That court affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff. Its theory was that the city had taxing jurisdiction by
reason of the business which originated there and might validly
measure the tax by the total premiums collected on risks there
although some of the persons insured had lived elsewhere when
they applied for policies. This rendered it unnecessary to con-
sider the defense contention that it was a denial of due process
of law to apply the tax to New Orleans business which was mere-
ly renewals on policies which had been applied for elsewhere.
These decisions doubtless bring the insurance companies no
cheer but they are sound in point of law and leave the subject
of local insurance license taxes on an intelligible footing.
Tax on Shipping Sweet Potatoes
Act 294 of 1942 imposes a tax of two cents per bushel up to
July 1, 1943, and of three cents per bushel thereafter, on all sweet
potatoes shipped in Louisiana. The proceeds are dedicated to
advertising sweet potatoes to increase consumption and, thus,
stimulate demand for that important Louisiana product. The
Louisiana Sweet Potato Advertising Agency was created to spend
the proceeds. Suit was brought against one Sibille for the amount
of the tax on certain shipments made by him. 4 Many persons
73. City of New Orleans v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 207 La. 745, 22 So.
(2d) 51 (1945).
74. Louisiana State Department of Agriculture v. Sibille, 207 La. 877, 22
So. (2d) 202 (1945).
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claiming to be sweet potato growers, buyers, shippers and deal-
ers intervened but no evidence was taken to show what their
status was. In his answer Sibille attacked the statute on a num-
ber of constitutional grounds. Doubtless the most significant of
those were that the tax was not for a public purpose and imposed
a license tax on agriculture in violation of Article X, Section 8,
of the State Constitution. The court recognized that the general
principle that taxes may be levied only for public purposes ap-
plied even though the express constitutional language on the sub-
ject (Article X, Section 1) refers only to property taxes. But it
considered advertising designed to stimulate demand for an im-
portant Louisiana agricultural product and calculated thereby to
add to the general prosperity of the state in the interest of the
general welfare and thus for a public purpose. As applied to
shipping by growers, however, the tax was declared invalid as a
license tax on those engaged in agricultural pursuits contrary to
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Sibille was not a
grower. The act contained a separability clause. As to him,
then, it was upheld. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented from the
ruling on constitutionality as to growers. The defendant was not
a grower and the act was separable so validity as applied to Si-
bille could be determined without considering application to
growers. Thus, insisted the chief justice, it was improper to go
into the matter. His reasoning is unanswerable. No issue was
joined with the interveners and no evidence taken on their
allegations. They were not, then, parties to the adjudication.
The court simply reached out and made a gratuitous determina-
tion of a constitutional question, contrary to established rules
of constitutional adjudication.
Expropriation
In the Westwego Canal and Terminal Company case, the
facts of which have been outlined under the head of "Property
Taxes,' '75 the plaintiff sought to recover the value of a canal boat
dock and certain land on the river bank in Jefferson Parish,
which the defendant levee district had appropriated in building
a levee. Plaintiff had judgment for $15,000. Both parties ap-
pealed. The court found itself unable, from the meagre proof of
value set out in the record, to determine the proper amount of
recovery. It, accordingly, resorted to the sensible measure of
75. Westwego Canal and Terminal Co. v. Lafourche Basin Levee District,
206 La. 270, 19 So. (2d) 133 (1944).
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sending the case back to the district court for the taking of
further evidence as to value.
The State Highway Commission acquired land adjoining that
of Schneidau for use as a borrow pit. The pit when dug was
165 by 440 feet, was 12 feet deep and contained 7 feet of
water. Schneidau claimed that it extended 14 feet into his land
along its full length of 440 feet. He sued the commission praying
a mandatory injunction requiring it to fill the pit and, in the al-
ternative, for the value of the property taken and for the amount
of damages to his remaining property." He alleged that the pit
was a nuisance, that it had no guard rails, that it was a breeding
place for mosquitoes and contained malodorous scum and putrid
vegetation. The district court, on conflicting evidence, found
that the borrow pit extended into the plaintiff's land as alleged,
denied an injunction and granted judgment for $250 for the land
taken and $2,250 for damages to the remaining land. Defendant
appealed. and plaintiff, answering, prayed again for a mandatory
injunction, or, in the alternative, for a higher award. The su-
preme court affirmed. Since the defendant's purchase of land
to obtain dirt was authorized by Act 108 of 1926, 77 the court re-
jected the prayer for an injunction. With respect to the question
of damage to the remaining land, emphasis was laid upon the
effect of the alleged nuisance upon commercial value instead of
impairment of enjoyment. With respect to consequential dam-
age Act 108 of 1926 provides for compensation for damage to im-
provements or crops on remaining land of the landowner and
stops there. Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution, however,
requires compensation for damage to as well as for taking of
private property. The plaintiff had donated a right of way across
his land for highwvay purposes in consideration of the benefits
to him from the highway. The borrow pit tract was acquired
months later. On those facts the court rejected the commission's
contention that the highway benefits be offset against plaintiff's
claim.
Legislation
In 1934 the Legislature passed an act authorizing Miss Annie
C. Lewis to sue the state for injuries she had sustained while
confined in a state institution many years before.78  The Con-
76. Schneidau v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 206 La. 754, 20 So. (2d)
14 (1944).
77. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 3604-3608.
78. La. Act 206 of 1934.
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stitution requires the legislature, in such a case, to provide a
method of procedure and the effect of the judgments which may
be rendered.79 This requirement was ignored and Miss Lewis'
suit went aground on the reef of unconstitutionality. The leg-
islature's next effort, Act 273 of 1942, provided for the payment
of any judgment which might be recovered, out of the General
Fund or any other fund specially appropriated to pay the claim
but mentioned procedure only in the title. The title recited that
the object was to consent to suit, to provide a method of proce-
dure, and so on, and even set out the venue. When Miss Lewis
brought her suit the district court sustained exceptions to the
jurisdiction, based on the same constitutional objection as in
the earlier case, and dismissed the suit. The supreme court,
however, sustained the act and overruled the exceptions.!1 The
court was justly annoyed with the whole business. The author
of the opinion must have had his tongue in his cheek when he
observed that surely the legislature had not intended to render
the measure abortive. I would prefer to think that such was the
intention;8 2 otherwise the legislature was unspeakably inept. At
all events, excessive judicial annoyance may breed bad law.
The court first took the ground that the consent to suit was an
act of waiver, not a law,8" and was, thus, in substance, no more
than a joint resolution, which was not governed by statutory
formalities and could be read as a whole, title and purview, to
establish the venue . 4 If to be considered a statute the measure
would still survive attack. The essential basis for this conclu-
sion was expressed as follows:
"When the Legislature grants authority to sue the state,
the rules of law and procedure applicable to suits between
individuals on a like or similar cause of action apply to such
79. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 6.
80. Lewis v. State, 196 La. 814, 200 So. 265 (1941).
81. Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. (2d) 917 (1945).
82. None of the other consent-to-suit acts passed at that session were
so badly drawn. Some specified how citation was to be served on the state,
the venue of the suit and that the proceedings should be conducted as pro-
vided by law for similar actions between private parties. Others covered
venue but said no more about procedure.
83. On this point see the discussion of the first Lewis case in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term (1942) 4 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIsw 215, 257.
84. No reference was made to the ancient formulation that the title is
no part of a law. It has been pointed out that the rule is hardly appropriate
in a state such as Louisiana, where the constitution requires that a statute
have a title. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3 ed., Horack, 1943)
§ 4802.
